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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides an overview of an emerging jurisprudence on 
terrorism sentencing under post-9/11 law in Canada, the UK, and 
Australia.  It seeks to advance three objectives.  One is to highlight 
similarities and differences in approach among these jurisdictions.  
Another is to lend context to a set of Ontario Court of Appeal decisions 
calling for stiffer sentences, and to show why future sentences may often 
be longer as a result—but not always.  Finally, the paper seeks to 
demonstrate how prosecutorial discretion on sentence limits can result in 
widely divergent outcomes at both the high and low end of the spectrum 
of culpability. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 9/11, few topics have received more attention from legal 
scholars and jurists than counter-terror law and policy.
1
  Yet very little has
been said about sentencing in particular.  Now that a first round of terror 
prosecutions has concluded, lending a better sense of how a new 
sentencing framework has been applied, a host of issues have surfaced.   
This paper explores these issues by surveying the Criminal Code 
framework for terror sentencing put in place after 9/11,
2
 and the early
1  
For commentary on Canada’s primary legislative response to 9/11, the Anti-terrorism 
Act, SC 2001, c 41, see Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, eds, The 
Security of Freedom: Canada’s Anti-terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2001) [Roach, The Security of Freedom]; Kent Roach, September 11: 
Consequences for Canada (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2003) [Roach, September 11]; W Wesley Pue, “The War on Terror: 
Constitutional Governance in a State of Permanent Warfare?” (2003) 41:2&3 Osgood 
Hall LJ 267; Robert Diab, Guantanamo North: Terrorism and the Administration of 
Justice in Canada (Fernwood Publishing: Halifax, 2008). 
2
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code or Code]. 
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cases that apply it.
3
  It then attempts to gain insight into the Canadian
framework by drawing a comparison with recent approaches to terror 
sentencing in the United Kingdom and Australia.   
In each of these jurisdictions, courts have placed emphasis on the 
principles of deterrence and denunciation.  As a result, even where an 
offender’s involvement in a serious plot has been limited, or where the 
plot has been thwarted early, courts have imposed a life sentence or a 
lengthy custodial term.  The Canadian framework is somewhat distinct, 
however, by virtue of the combined operation of a series of factors.  These 
include maximum sentences for offences such as participation in or 
facilitating terrorism; the need to consider conflicting principles such as 
rehabilitation and deterrence; credit for pre-trial custody; and limits on 
parole ineligibility periods.   
Given these factors, recent appellate decisions calling for more 
emphasis on deterrence and denunciation may often result in longer 
sentences in future cases—but not always.4  A further factor worth noting
is that Canada’s framework affords the Crown broad discretion in 
prosecutorial approaches, including the possibility of circumventing 
maximum sentences for terrorism offences that are shorter than life, and 
seeking a life sentence instead.  In ways to be explored below, the 
exercise of this discretion can lead to a wide range of outcomes.  As a 
result, in many cases, whether a sentence seems too high or low will 
depend at least as much on the Crown’s approach as it does on the court’s 
response. 
3
See e.g. R v Khawaja, [2009] 248 CCC (3d) 233 (Ont SC) [Khawaja (Trial)], var’d 
2010 ONCA 862, 103 OR (3d) 321, 273 CCC (3d) 415 [Khawaja (Appeal)]; R v 
Ahmad, 2010 ONSC 5874; R v Khalid, (2009) Brampton Registry No.: 2025/07, Ont 
SC [(Khalid, (Trial)], var’d 2010 ONCA 861, 103 OR (3d) 600, 266 CCC (3d) 105 
[Khalid (Appeal)]; R v Gaya, 2010 ONSC 434, 255 CCC (3d) 419 [Gaya (Trial)], 
var’d 2010 ONCA 860, 266 CCC (3d) 428 [Gaya (Appeal)]; R v Dirie, 2009 CanLII 
58598 (Ont SC).  This paper also refers briefly to R v Durrani, (2010) Brampton 
Registry No.: 2025/07, Ont SC; R v Ansari, (2010) Brampton Registry No.: 2025/07, 
Ont SC; R v James, (2010) Brampton Registry No.: 2025/07, Ont SC (all three are 
noted in R v Ahmad, 2010 ONSC 5874 at paras 67–69).  See also the British 
Columbia Supreme Court’s decision in R v Thambithurai, (14 May 2010) Vancouver 
Registry No.: 24958 (a 6-month custodial sentence for funding terror), aff’d 
Thambithurai, 2011 BCCA 137.   
4
See discussion below of Khawaja (Appeal), ibid; Khalid (Appeal), ibid. 
SENTENCING OF TERRORISM OFFENCES AFTER 9/11 351 
I. TERRORISM SENTENCING IN CANADA PRIOR TO 2001 
Before the Anti-terrorism Act was passed in December of 2001, 
acts associated with terror were prosecuted under a range of offences in 
the Criminal Code.
5
  These included murder, hijacking, possessing or
using explosives, or unlawfully causing bodily harm or death.
6
  The Code
also captured the conspiracy or attempt to carry out acts amounting to 
terrorism, or the effort to assist in them before or after the fact.
7
  The
range of penalties included life without parole for 25 years in the case of 
murder, and up to life for hijacking.
8
  Possession of an explosive
substance with intent to cause serious bodily harm or death carried a 
maximum life sentence,
9
 as did conspiracy to commit murder.
10
  While
these provisions still apply in terror prosecutions, their function is now 
amended in ways to be explored below.   
II. THE IMPETUS FOR NEW ANTI-TERROR LAW IN CANADA, THE UK,
AND AUSTRALIA AFTER 9/11
A primary impetus for passing new counter-terror law in the wake 
of 9/11 was United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted on 
September 28, 2001.
11
  This called on member states to reform criminal
law regimes to “[e]nsure that any person who participates in the 
financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in 
supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice.”12  It also called on states to
5 Kent Roach, “The New Terrorism Offences and the Criminal Law” in Roach, The 
Security of Freedom, supra note 1 at 152. 
6
Criminal Code, supra note 2, ss 230 (murder); 76 (hijacking); 81–82 (explosives); 
269 (unlawfully causing bodily harm); and 222(5) (unlawfully causing death).  See 
also Roach, ibid at 152 for a more extensive catalogue of offences and applicable 
Code provisions. 
7
Criminal Code, ibid ss 465 (conspiracy); 24 (attempt); 21(1), 22 (assistance). 
8
Ibid s 76. 
9
Ibid s 81(2)(a). 
10
Ibid s 465(1)(a). 
11
Resolution 1373, UNSCOR, 2000, UN Doc S/Res/1373 [Resolution 1373].  On the 
role of this resolution as a primary impetus for legislative responses to 9/11, see Kent 
Roach, “Sources and Trends in Post-9/11 Anti-terrorism Laws” in Benjamin J Goold 
and Liora Lazarus, eds, Security and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 
[Roach, “Sources and Trends”].  
12
Resolution 1373, ibid s 2(e). 
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establish “terrorist acts … as serious criminal offences in domestic laws” 
and to ensure that “the punishment duly reflects the seriousness such 
terrorist acts.”13  Two and a half months later, Canada enacted the Anti-
terrorism Act, which inserted a chapter on terrorism offences into the 
Criminal Code.  The United Kingdom added to its Terrorism Act 2000
14
by passing the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,
15
 followed
by a series of other statutes over the course of the decade.
16
  Australia
enacted the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002, and 
other laws.
17
 These new laws offered new possibilities for prosecuting and
punishing acts of terror, turning on an expansive statutory definition of 
“terrorism.” 
As Kent Roach has noted, many states, including Canada and 
Australia, drew on the definition of terrorism in the UK Terrorism Act, 
2000 as a precedent.
18
  The UK Act defines terrorism as any act involving
violence, serious damage to property, or risk to public safety that is 
“designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and … 
[is done] for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause.”19  The definition of a “terrorist activity” created by Canada’s Anti-
terrorism Act requires a similar connection between violence and the 
intention of “intimidating the public … or compelling a person, a 
government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to 




(UK), c 11. 
15
(UK), c 24. 
16
See e.g. Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK), c 44; Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
(UK), c 2; Terrorism Act 2006 (UK), c 11; Counter-terrorism Act 2008 (UK), c 28; 
and the Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act 2010 (UK), c 2. 
17
Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) [Security Legislation 
Act].  Other acts include Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-hoax and Other Measures) 
Act 2002 (Cth); Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Act 
2002 (Cth); Criminal Code Amendment (Espionage and Related Matters) Act 2002 
(Cth); Criminal Code Amendment (Offences Against Australians) Act 2002 (Cth).  For 
an overview of this legislation, see Philip Ruddock, “Australia’s Legislative Response 
to the Ongoing Threat of Terrorism” (2004) 27:2 UNSWLJ 254. 
18
Roach, “Sources and Trends,” supra note 11 at 242. 
19
Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 14 s 1. 
20
Criminal Code, supra note 2 s 83.01(1).  A similar definition is found in Australia’s 
Security Legislation Act, supra note 17, Schedule 1, Part 5.3, Division 100.  See 
Roach, “Sources and Trends,” supra note 11 at 243 on the differences between 
British, Canadian, and Australian definitions.   
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committed “in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological 
purpose, objective or cause.”21
III. THE NEW CANADIAN FRAMEWORK FOR TERRORISM SENTENCING
The Anti-terrorism Act altered Canada’s framework for terror
sentencing in various ways.  One was to include a series of new terrorism 
offences.  Among them are the offences of participating in a terrorist 
group or facilitating its terrorist activity;
22
 instructing or directing others
to engage in terrorism;
23
 and financing or providing property for
terrorism.
24
Participating in and funding terror carry ten-year maximum 
sentences; for facilitating, the maximum is fourteen years.
25
  However, a
key provision of the Anti-terrorism Act allows for these limits to be 
circumvented.  It asserts broadly that notwithstanding any other provision 
of the Code “a person convicted of an indictable offence, other than an 
offence for which a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed as a 
minimum punishment” is liable to receive a life sentence if “the act or 
omission constituting the offence also constitutes a terrorist activity.”26  In
other words, if the Crown wishes to seek a life sentence for participating 
or facilitating, or any other indictable offense amounting to a terrorist 
activity, it may do so, provided the accused is given notice before entering 
a plea.
27
  A further provision imposes a maximum life sentence for
committing any indictable offence in association with, or for the benefit 
of, a terrorist group.
28
The Act also stipulates that where multiple sentences for terrorism 
offences are imposed, aside from one of life imprisonment, the sentences 
21
The constitutional validity of this aspect of the definition was upheld in Khawaja 
(Appeal), supra note 3 at paras 95–117. 
22
Criminal Code, ss 83.18–83.19. 
23
Ibid s 83.21.  
24
Ibid s 83.02.  Various commentators have explored the constitutional and 
criminological merits of these new offences: see the contributions noted, supra note 1. 
25
Criminal Code, ibid ss 83.02, 83.18(1), 83.19(1). 
26
Ibid s 83.27.  I am indebted to the anonymous referee of this paper for pointing out 
this possibility. 
27
Ibid s 83.27(2). 
28
Ibid s 83.2. 
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are to be served consecutively.
29
  Notably, the government chose not to
impose mandatory minimum sentences for any terrorism offences.
30
The Anti-terrorism Act also amended section 718.2 the Criminal 
Code, which deems certain facts to be aggravating circumstances at 
sentencing.  The section now calls for an increase in sentence where there 
is “evidence that the offence was a terrorism offence.”31  This amendment
calls attention to the fact that while deterrence and denunciation have 
been primary considerations in terrorism cases, it is also necessary to 
consider other sentencing principles in the Code.  Courts must therefore 
observe the principle that “where consecutive sentences are imposed, the 
combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh.”32  A sentence
must also be tailored to the varying degrees of responsibility for an 
offence.
33
  Similarly, in striving to impose a “just sanction,” it is open to
the court to craft a sentence that has, as one of its objectives, the 
rehabilitation of the offender.
34
  The implications of this possible conflict
of principles are explored further below. 
None of the penalty provisions in the terrorism chapter of the 
Criminal Code speak to the question of parole eligibility.  Section 
743.6(1.2), however, states that where an offender is sentenced for a 
terrorism offence, the court 
shall order that the portion of the sentence that must be served 
before the offender may be released on full parole is one half of the 
sentence or ten years, whichever is less, unless the court is satisfied, 
having regard to the circumstances of the commission of the offence 
and the character and circumstances of the offender, that the 
expression of society’s denunciation of the offence and the 
objectives of specific and general deterrence would be adequately 
29
Ibid s 83.26. 
30
Roach, September 11, supra note 1 at 46, suggests that mandatory minimum 
sentences for terrorism offences would likely have survived a Charter challenge (as 
cruel and unusual punishment), given the Supreme Court of Canada’s deference to 
Parliament on the mandatory minimum at issue in R v Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39, [2000] 
2 SCR 90.   
31
Criminal Code, supra note 2 s 718.2(a)(v). 
32
Ibid s 718.2(c). 
33
Ibid s 718.1: the Code’s “fundamental principle” of sentencing is that: “A sentence 
must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of 
the offender.” 
34
Ibid s 718(d). 
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served by a period of parole ineligibility determined in accordance 
with the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. 
There are several points to note here.  First, the section raises the period of 
parole ineligibility from what it would be otherwise—i.e. from either one-
third of the sentence or seven years, whichever is shorter, to one-half or 
ten years.
35
  Second, this is a discretionary provision.  It will likely be
followed in most cases.  However, the court may avoid imposing an 
additional parole ineligibility period if the enumerated principles of 
sentencing can be adequately addressed otherwise.
36
Third, the practical operation of the section can entail shorter non-
parole periods than is suggested on first reading.  If a life sentence is 
imposed, the non-parole period of ten years is calculated from the time of 
arrest or detention, not sentencing.
37
  Where a determinate sentence is
imposed, an offender will likely receive credit for pre-trial custody.
38
Often this credit will account for a significant portion of the sentence; 
however, the non-parole period will apply only to the portion remaining 
to be served.  In R v Dirie, for example, the offender was sentenced to two 
years of a notional seven-year sentence (having received five years’ credit 
for roughly 2.5 years in pre-trial custody).
39
  The non-parole period is
35
Provision for the shorter non-parole period is found in the Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20, s 120.  The rule does not apply in the case of 
a mandatory life sentence. 
36
The discretion not to impose a longer non-parole period was exercised in both v Gaya 
(Trial), supra note 3 at paras 129–136, and Khalid (Trial), supra note 3.  In each case, 
Durno J found that a shorter parole period was consistent with the direction provided 
in Criminal Code s 743.6(2), which states: “[f]or greater certainty, the paramount 
principles which are to guide the court under this section are denunciation and 
specific or general deterrence, with rehabilitation of the offender, in all cases, being 
subordinate to these paramount principles.” At para 130 of Gaya, Durno J noted that 
“[t]he offender bears the burden of establishing on the balance of probabilities that the 
named objectives can be adequately served by the standard parole eligibility.” Durno 
J held that Gaya had satisfied this burden in part on the basis of his limited role in the 
plot, and that Khalid had done so partly based on his not appearing to pose a 
continuing danger.  The Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the shorter non-parole 
period in both cases: Gaya (Appeal), supra note 3; Khalid (Appeal), supra note 3. 
37
This is due to the operation of the Criminal Code, supra note 2 s 746.  See e.g. R v 
Amara, 2010 ONSC 441, [2010] OJ No 181 [Amara (Trial)], aff’d 2010 ONCA 858, 
266 CCC (3d) 422 [Amara (Appeal)]; R c Namouh, 2010 QCCQ 943, 74 CR (6th) 
376 in which life sentences were imposed.   
38
This is provided for in s 719(3) of the Code.  Recent amendments to this provision are 
discussed below.   
39
Dirie, supra note 3 at para 73. 
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only one year.  Finally, the section speaks only of “full parole,” not lesser 
forms of release, such as weekend or day parole.
40
The larger significance of this section is to suggest that in even the 
most serious of terrorism cases (short of where a murder conviction is 
obtained), the parole ineligibility period will be no longer than 10 years, 
and it could be much shorter if the period is calculated from the time of 
detention as opposed to sentencing.   
In summary, the new sentencing framework would seem to fulfill 
the UN Security Council’s call for stiffer punishments for terrorism 
offences.  But in ways to be seen, it also allows for relatively short 
sentences for marginal figures involved in serious plots, and for shorter 
non-parole periods for longer sentences.  This is in part a consequence of 
the fact that terror sentencing unfolds within a larger sentencing 
framework in Canadian law.   
IV. CANADIAN SENTENCING DECISIONS UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM
ACT
The early cases highlight a central conundrum for judges: how to 
address the many competing considerations on sentencing in the Criminal 
Code.
41
  Courts must strive to place an emphasis on deterrence and
denunciation while also factoring in varying degrees of culpability and the 
possibility of rehabilitation.
42
  Multiple convictions for terrorism offences
call for consecutive sentences, yet a global sentence should not be 
“unduly long or harsh.”43  The Ontario Court of Appeal has sought to
provide some direction on each of these points, suggesting the likelihood 
of longer sentences in the future.  Yet, for reasons that can be gleaned 
from the early cases, the length of future sentences will also be shaped in 
large part by Crown elections with respect to maximum sentences and—
in terms of time actually served—the function of parole eligibility 
provisions and credit for pre-trial custody. 
40
Under section 119(1)(c) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, supra note 
35, an offender subject to an order under section 743.6 of the Code would be eligible 
for day parole six months prior to their eligibility for full parole.   
41
See cases supra note 3. 
42
Criminal Code, supra note 2 ss 718.1, 718.2. 
43
Ibid s 718.2(c). 
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A. KHAWAJA 
The first prosecution and sentencing under the new Code 
framework was R v Khawaja.  The accused was a 25-year old Ottawa 
resident who, in 2002, formed an association with a group of extremists in 
the UK and Pakistan.  His involvement involved travel to London and 
Lahore, where he briefly attended a training camp.  He also gave members 
money and access to his parents’ apartment in Pakistan.  In addition to 
this, before the group was arrested in March 2004, Khawaja worked on 
the prototype of a remote-detonation explosive device he called the 
“hifidigimonster.”  He agreed to build roughly 30 of them for the group’s 
use in the UK or elsewhere.   
Principal members of the London group were found in possession 
of 600 kilograms of ammonium nitrate-rich fertilizer, along with maps of 
the UK’s national utility grid.  In the prosecution of Khawaja’s UK co-
conspirators, these materials were found to form part of a specific plot to 
set off explosions at targets in central London (the “fertilizer bomb plot”).  
Wiretap evidence raised questions about the extent of Khawaja’s 
knowledge of this plot, given that he participated in discussions of targets 
that included airports and nightclubs, and fuel, water, and energy utilities.   
Following a search of Khawaja’s Ottawa home, police seized various 
electronic components, two semi-automatic military rifles, 640 rounds of 
ammunition, documents relating to violent jihad, and $10,300 in cash. 
A large part of Khawaja’s defence consisted of the claim that he 
lacked knowledge of the fertilizer bomb plot, and that his primary 
intention was to assist the group in their involvement with insurgents in 
Afghanistan.  Rutherford J had a reasonable doubt about Khawaja’s 
knowledge of the fertilizer plot, but convicted him on six counts of terror-
related offences.  The most serious was that of intending to cause an 
explosion endangering life, and doing so in association with a terrorist 
group.
44
Notably, Rutherford J suggested that in convicting Khawaja for 
these offences, he was culpable for more than simply an intent to assist 
44
Ibid ss 81(1), 83.2 (the latter carrying a life maximum).  The remaining offences were 
participating in a terrorist group (for receiving training) (s 83.18(1); 10 year 
maximum); funding terror (ss 83.01(1), 83.21(1); a life maximum); making property 
available to facilitate a terrorist activity (ss 83.01(1), 83.03(a); a 10-year maximum); 
participating in a terrorist activity (meetings in the UK relating to bomb-building) (ss 
83.01(1), 83.18; a 10-year maximum); and facilitating a terrorist activity (ss 83.01(1), 
83.19; a 14-year maximum). 
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with the group’s plans in Afghanistan.  In building the bomb, “Khawaja’s 
activity was directed at assisting his terrorist associates in a way that 
could only result in serious injury, death and destruction to people and 
property somewhere.”45  This could include London or the UK:  “On the
evidence, it is unclear what he knew or anticipated as to where they would 
be used, or that Khawaja even cared where they would be used.  His Emir 
or leader asked him to provide them and he agreed.  There is no 
suggestion that he would exercise any control over their deployment once 
he placed them in Khyam’s possession.”46
The Crown sought a life sentence for building a bomb and funding 
terror, and close to the maximum on the remaining counts.  The defence 
argued for a total sentence of 7.5 years; or, with double credit for pre-trial 
custody, a sentence of time served.  The court imposed a global sentence 
of a further 10.5 years, without apportioning a specific amount of credit 
for pre-trial custody.
47
  Parole non-eligibility was set at five years.
48
Both Crown and defence appealed the sentence.  The Ontario 
Court of Appeal’s decision in this case, together with its reasons in R v 
Khalid, are currently the leading authorities on terror sentencing in 
Canada.
49
  On this basis, Rutherford J’s initial sentence is worth
canvassing briefly, for the context it lends to both the appellate decision 
and sentences imposed in other cases.    
Mitigating circumstances considered by Rutherford J included 
Khawaja’s age, lack of a criminal record, and conduct in prison.  While 
Rutherford J held that the emphasis in terror cases should be placed on 
“denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the public,”50 he also noted
that “the potential for rehabilitation … cannot be overlooked.”51  In this
case, however, he found that “the Court knows virtually nothing about 
[Khawaja’s] potential for reformation, of any sense of responsibility or of 
45




Khawaja received four years for bomb-building in association with a terrorist group; 
two years each for participation in the training camp, providing funding, and making 
property available; and three months for participating in discussions relating to 
terrorism activity in the UK and facilitating those activities (Ibid, at para 54).  
48
Ibid, supra note 3 at para 55. 
49
Khawaja (Appeal), supra note 3; Khalid (Appeal), supra note 3. 
50
Khawaja (Trial), supra note 3 at para 24. 
51
Ibid at para 26. 
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any remorse he may feel for his criminal conduct, or of the likelihood of 
his re-offending.”52  Khawaja had not testified, would not be interviewed
for the pre-sentence report, and made no statement at sentencing.  The 
court treated the uncertainty about remorse and rehabilitative prospects as 
a neutral factor. 
The analysis also turned on an assessment of Khawaja’s degree of 
responsibility.  The court dismissed the suggestion that Khawaja’s lack of 
knowledge of the specific intent to use the “hifidigimonster” in the 
fertilizer bomb plot was a mitigating factor.  The detonators were clearly 
“intended to unleash fireworks at other as yet unspecified places in aid of 
the jihad.”53 Nor was it mitigating that the “hifidigimonster” was said to
be “amateurish” and needed more work.54  Khawaja’s culpability was
serious; just how serious was the issue. 
The Crown urged the court to consider Khawaja’s culpability to be 
comparable to that of his UK co-conspirators who received life sentences 
in R v Khyam.
55
  Rutherford J declined to do so on the basis that Khawaja
was “a willing helper and supporter, but Khyam, Amin, Akbar, Garcia 
and Mahmood were away out in front of [him] in terms of their 
determination to bring death, destruction and terror to innocent people.”56
Yet, apart from noting Khawaja’s lack of specific knowledge of the 
fertilizer plot, Rutherford J did not expand upon this assertion.
57
The direction in 718.2(c) of the Code, calling for a global sentence 
that is not “unduly long or harsh,” posed a further challenge—given the 
requirement for consecutive sentences in section 83.26.  Rutherford J 
interpreted the one section as a constraint upon the other.  To support this 
reading, he drew upon Lamer CJ’s dicta in the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in R v M (CA),58 to the effect that “[w]hether under the
rubric of the ‘totality principle’ or a more generalized principle of 
proportionality, Canadian courts have been reluctant to impose single and 
52
Ibid at para 27. 
53
Ibid at para 32. 
54
Rutherford J noted, at para 33, ibid, that Khawaja’s “device, as seized, would not do 
the job, although it would take only minor modifications to change that.” 
55
[2008] EWCA Crim 1612, [2009] 1 Cr App R (S) 77 [Khyam]. 
56
Khawaja (Trial), supra note 3 at para 37.  
57 Khawaja’s UK co-conspirators, apart from Khyam, also lacked knowledge of the 
specifics.  
58
[1996] 1 SCR 500 [M(CA)]. 
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consecutive fixed-term sentences beyond 20 years.”59  Rutherford J 
therefore implied that where consecutive sentences are imposed for terror 
offences, they should not exceed that ceiling.   
On appeal, Khawaja’s sentence on count 1 (bomb-building in 
association with a terror group) was raised from four years to life without 
parole for ten years.  The period of the remaining counts was raised from 
6 to 24 years, to be served concurrently.  The court allowed the Crown’s 
appeal on the basis of both specific errors in the decision below and an 
error in the “overall approach” to the sentencing of terrorism offences.60 
The first of the specific errors pertained to the distinction between 
Khawaja’s culpability and that of his UK co-conspirators.  The claim that 
the latter were “way out in front” in their determination to bring death and 
destruction was “not borne out by the record.”61  The record, including the 
emails cited in the trial decision, attests to a deep “commitment to violent 
Jihad” and a “willingness to do anything and go anywhere to promote 
violent Jihad.”62  The court conjectured that Rutherford J might have 
meant that Khawaja’s UK associates were closer to realizing their plans, 
but if so this was irrelevant.  His level of determination was comparable, 
and thus also his “degree of moral blameworthiness.”63  
A more serious error was treating the lack of evidence of remorse 
as a neutral factor.  On the contrary, in the court’s view, “the absence of 
any evidence of the appellant’s remorse or of his prospects for 
reformation should have been treated as a significant indicator of his 
present and future dangerousness.”64  Without “convincing evidence” that 
violent Jihad has been repudiated, a terrorism offender “continues to pose 
a serious threat to society and is likely to do so for the indefinite future.”65  
Even where the offender does repudiate terror, the court was clear to state 
that rehabilitation remains relevant in terror sentencing but that its import 
is “significantly reduced in this context given the unique nature of the 
crime of terrorism.”66 
                                                 
59
  Ibid at para 43, cited in Khawaja (Trial), supra note 3 at para 39. 
60
  Khawaja (Appeal), supra note 48 at para 192. 
61
  Ibid at para 194. 
62
  Ibid. 
63
  Ibid at para 196. 
64
  Ibid at para 200. 
65
  Ibid. 
66
  Ibid at para 201. 
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A third error pertained to Rutherford J’s resolution of the apparent 
conflict between sections 83.26 (consecutive sentences) and 718.2(c) (not 
unduly long).  Rutherford J read M(CA) to stand for the proposition that 
20 years marks a notional benchmark for what is “unduly long or harsh” 
in section 718.2(c), one that would apply to the directive to impose 
consecutive sentences in section 83.26.  The appellate court held that this 
reading runs contrary to the holding in M(CA), and also belies the 
intention of including section 83.26 in the terror sentencing framework.  
In M(CA), the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the validity of a 25-
year global sentence that consisted of shorter consecutive terms.  It found 
that despite the tendency in recent years for courts not to exceed the 20-
year mark, neither the Code nor the Charter’s protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment precluded this.
67
  The Court of Appeal in Khawaja 
explored M(CA) at some length to ground the assertion that section 83.26 
“reflects Parliament’s intention that the general principle of totality must 
be moderated or altered in the case of terrorism-related crimes … the 
customary upper range for consecutive fixed-term sentences will not be 
applicable.”68  
Turning to the larger error of “overall approach,” the court set out 
three more general grounds on which the sentence below was “manifestly 
unfit.  The sentence failed to reflect the “enormity” of the crime: 
Terrorism, in our view, is in a special category of crime and must be 
treated as such.  When the terrorist activity, to the knowledge of the 
offender, is designed to or is likely to result in the indiscriminate 
injury and killing of innocent human beings, sentences exceeding 20 




                                                 
67
  M(CA) preceded the inclusion of the directive in section 718.2 to avoid “unduly long 
or harsh” global sentences, but it considered the issue in light of the requirement that 
global sentences be “just and appropriate” in accordance with the older section 717.  
At para 72, Lamer CJ stated: “I see no reason why numerical sentences in Canada 
ought to be de facto limited at 20 years as a matter of judicial habit or convention.  
Whether a fixed-term sentence beyond 20 years is imposed as a sentence for a single 
offence where life imprisonment is available but not imposed, or as a cumulative 
sentence for multiple offences where life imprisonment is not available, there is no a 
priori ceiling on fixed-term sentences under the Code.”  
68
  Khawaja (Appeal), supra note 48 at para 210. 
69
  Ibid at para 238.  The judgment contains this qualification at para 220: “In advocating 
this sentencing approach to terrorist-related activity that, to the offender’s knowledge, 
is designed to or is likely to result in the indiscriminate killing of human beings, we 
are not suggesting that there will never be cases of that nature for which the 
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The sentence also “failed to adequately reflect the continuing danger the 
offender presents to society,” based on the absence of evidence of 
remorse.
70
  Finally, the principle of deterrence requires that terrorism 
“must be dealt with in the severest of terms.”71 
The court’s imposition of a life sentence in Khawaja, and the call 
for lengthier sentences as a norm in terror sentencing, is certainly 
significant.  It suggests that Canadian cases will be brought into closer 
conformity with UK and Australian decisions, with their emphasis on 
deterrence and denunciation as primary principles.  Yet the potential 
impact of the Khawaja appeal should not be overstated.  Depending on 
how the Crown chooses to proceed, maximum sentences for participating 
in or facilitating terror, coupled with credit for pre-trial custody, may 
preclude sentences in the range considered here.
72
  A further disparity 
remains in the area of parole ineligibility. 
Following Rutherford’s J’s sentence, Khawaja was eligible for full 
parole five years after sentencing.  Where a life sentence is imposed, 
however, section 746.2(c) dates the beginning of a 10-year parole 
ineligibility period to the time of arrest.  As a result, given Khawaja’s 
close to five years of pre-trial custody, his parole ineligibility on appeal is 
virtually unchanged.  Thus, the de facto custodial term in this case might 
prove to be much shorter than those imposed in comparable UK and 
Australian cases.  For example, Khawaja’s co-conspirators in the UK 
(excluding Khyam), received life sentences with parole ineligibility 
periods ranging from 17.5 to 20 years from the date of sentencing.  In the 
Australian case of R v Elomar,
73
 the conspirators amassed weapons, 
bomb-building materials and contemplated various targets, without 
settling upon any in particular at the time the plot was foiled.  There was 
also a reasonable doubt as to a deliberate intention to cause casualties.   
Sentences ranged from 23 to 28 years, with non-parole periods ranging 
from 17 to 21 years. 
 
                                                                                                                         
appropriate sentence will be within or below the 15 to 20–year customary range.  For 
example, full and meaningful cooperation by the offender with law enforcement 
authorities in the detection of terrorists and terrorist activity may well alleviate against 
the imposition of longer than customary sentences.” 
70
  Ibid at para 239. 
71
  Ibid at para 246. 
72
  See e.g. Dirie, supra note 3; Ahmad, supra note 3.  
73
  [2010] NSWSC 10.  
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B.  AMARA, GAYA, KHALID, DIRIE, AND AHMAD 
These cases concern a group known as the “Toronto 18.”  In the 
fall of 2005, Ahmad and Amara, then only 20, formed an association with 
a view to setting up a terrorist training camp in Washago, a rural town 
outside of Toronto.  Possible targets included CSIS’s headquarters and the 
CBC building in Toronto, Parliament, military bases, and a nuclear power 
plant.
74
  Ahmad played a leadership role at this stage, recruiting 13 other 
young men to the group.  A camp was held in December, where Ahmad 
showed videos encouraging violent jihad and gave a motivational speech.  
In March of 2006, Ahmad and Amara had a falling out, splitting the group 
in two.  Amara’s group developed a more specific terror plot, and took 
further steps to its fulfillment.  A number of convictions have followed 
the arrest of members of both groups in June 2006.   
 
I. AMARA 
Amara’s sentence is the longest of the group and his culpability is 
clearly the most serious.   Following the split with Ahmad, Amara had 
developed a remote detonation device and coordinated his smaller groups’ 
collection of materials, including large amounts of ammonium nitrate.  
They conspired to bomb the Toronto Stock Exchange, a CSIS building, 
and a military headquarters in November of 2006.  Their goal was to 
persuade Canada to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.  At the time of 
their arrest, Amara and other members were removing bomb-making 
materials from storage.  Equipment relating to bomb-making was seized 
from Amara’s home, along with ammunition and $12,000 in cash. 
Amara pleaded guilty to two counts: participating in a terrorist 
group and intending to cause an explosion endangering life, in association 
with a terrorist group.
75
  The Crown sought the maximum sentence on 
each count: 10 years and life, respectively; defence proposed a total of 18 
years.   Durno J imposed a life sentence for the bomb plot and 21 months 
for participation, giving seven-year’s credit for pre-trial custody.  The 
non-parole period imposed was 10 years from the time of his arrest, or six 
years and 3.5 months from sentencing. 
In arriving at the sentence, Durno J accorded some weight to the 
evidence of a psychiatrist as to Amara’s positive progress in custody, his 
                                                 
74
  See the factual summary in Ahmad, supra note 3. 
75
  Contrary to Criminal Code, ss 83.81(1), 83(1)(a), 83.2 respectively. 
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acceptance of responsibility, and “strong willingness to change his 
attitudes and behaviours.”76  This was coupled with the offender’s guilty 
plea, lengthy statement of remorse at sentencing, his age, lack of a 
criminal record, and his being a husband and father of a young family.  
Aggravating factors included the planned and deliberate nature of the 
crime, Amara’s leadership role and active recruiting of others, and the use 
of firearms.  Above all, it was a “terrorist offence,” one in which “there is 
no dispute that what would have occurred was multiple death and 
injuries.”77  Durno J described this as among “the most serious kind of 
terrorism imaginable.”78  The devices were not “amateur” in nature, nor 
the larger plot “inevitably doomed to failure.”79  In short, Amara was “the 
leader and directing mind of a plot that would have resulted in the most 
horrific crime Canada has ever seen.”80  Applying the principles set out in 





Saad Gaya was a member of Amara’s group for roughly a month 
in the summer of 2006.  Eighteen at the time of the offence, Gaya pleaded 
guilty to intending to cause an explosion endangering life, and doing so in 
association with a terrorist group.
82
  He knowingly contributed to the 
group’s activity, but had limited knowledge of the larger plot.  He was 
tasked with finding a place to store three tons of ammonium nitrate.
83
  
Gaya had provided a statement to police, was remorseful, and took full 
responsibility for the offence.  Giving him 7.5 years’ credit for roughly 
three years and eight months of pre-trial custody, Durno J imposed a 




                                                 
76
  Amara (Trial), supra note 37 at para 59. 
77
  Ibid at para 102. 
78
  Ibid at para 141. 
79
  Ibid at para 143. 
80
  Ibid at para 145. 
81
  Amara (Appeal), supra note 37. 
82
  Contrary to ss 81(1), 83.2 of the Criminal Code. 
83
  At a pre-trial hearing, Durno J found that Gaya was “wilfully blind that it was likely 
that the explosion(s) would cause serious death or bodily harm.” Gaya (Trial), supra 
note 3 at para 3. 
84
  On this shorter parole period, see supra note 36. 
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Assessing Gaya’s culpability, Durno J emphasized that he was 
“not the prime mover in the plot.  He did not know all the details of the 
plan.  He took detailed orders.  He did not give them.…  He did not know 
anything about bomb making.”85  Gaya’s rehabilitative prospects, his 
experience in custody, and with the trial led Durno J to conclude that “he 
has already be specifically deterred and is not a continuing danger to the 
public.”86  
The Court of Appeal raised Gaya’s 12-year sentence to 18 years, 
extending the remaining term of 4.5 years to 10.5 years.  It also set the 
non-parole period at half the remaining custodial term: five years and 
three months.
87
  The initial sentence “did not adequately reflect the unique 
nature of terrorism-related crimes, nor did it adequately reflect the 
enormity of the respondent’s crime and the role he played in it.”88 
 
III. KHALID 
Khalid’s case is similar to Gaya’s but more pertinent due to the 
way it highlights a tension in terror sentencing between a high degree of 
culpability and often compelling mitigating circumstances.  In particular, 
like Gaya, Khalid was a youthful offender with bright prospects (a 19-
year old university student) and no criminal record.  He was remorseful 
and appeared to pose no continuing danger.  Yet his culpability was 
greater.  While he admitted to being a member of the bomb plot, he 
claimed not know that the planned explosions would cause death or 
bodily harm.  In an earlier decision, he was found to have been wilfully 
blind of this fact,
89
 but unaware that he was intended to drive a van 
containing a bomb to one of the targets.
90
  He pleaded guilty to intending 
to cause an explosion endangering life, and doing so in association with a 
terrorist group. 
The seriousness of the offence called for a term in the range of 18 
to 20 years as suggested by the Crown, but due to the mitigating factors, 
                                                 
85
  Gaya (Trial), supra note 3 at para 120. 
86
  Ibid at para 19. 
87
  Gaya (Appeal), supra note 3. 
88
  Ibid at para 19. 
89
  R v Khalid, 2009 CanLII 44274 (ON SC), at para 119. 
90
  Ibid.  The summary of the sentencing decision set out here draws from Khalid 
(Appeal), supra note 3. 
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Durno J held that a shorter term was appropriate.  Khalid was sentenced 
to 14 years, with 7-years’ credit for 39 months of pre-trial custody, and no 
order was imposed for a longer non-parole period under section 
743.6(1.2). 
As in Gaya, the Court of Appeal found that the sentence “did not 
adequately reflect the enormity of the respondent’s crime and the 
significant part he played in it.”91  Mitigating factors had been 
overemphasized.  In the Court of Appeal’s view, “were it not for the 
mitigating features that serve to reduce the length of sentence, the 
respondent would most certainly have been a candidate for a life 
sentence.”92  Although Khalid’s remorse may have been sincere, he 
continued to minimize his involvement, and despite the findings of a 
psychiatrist, the danger he continued to pose was indeterminate.  A longer 
sentence for first time young adult offenders in this context was also 
found to be necessary for the purposes of general deterrence, given the 
“sad truth … that young home-grown terrorists with no criminal 
antecedents have become a reality.”93  The sentence was raised from 14 to 
20 years, or from 7 to 13 years remaining, with a non-parole of half this 
term imposed under section 743.6(1.2). 
 
IV. AHMAD 
After thirteen days of trial before a jury, Ahmad pleaded guilty to 
participation in a terrorist group, importing firearms on the group’s 
behalf, and knowingly instructing six others to carry out an activity for the 
benefit of the group.
94
  The Crown had not sought a life sentence, given 
the offender’s guilty plea, youth, and lack of a criminal record.  Dawson J 
imposed a 16-year sentence, giving eight years and nine months’ credit 
for pre-trial custody.  This left seven years and three months to be served, 
with parole ineligibility set at half that time.   
Dawson J characterized Ahmad’s culpability, after the split with 
Amara, to be limited.  He sought to gather firearms and held a further 
“amateurish” training camp.  Ahmad was, in the words of an informant, 
“an exaggerator who had talked a good game … but had not been able to 
                                                 
91
  Khalid (Appeal), ibid at para 32. 
92
  Ibid at para 36. 
93
  Ibid at para 47. 
94
  Contrary Criminal Code, ss 81.18, 103, 83.2, 83.21 respectively. 
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develop any real operational capability.”95  He was also remorseful.  Yet 
this was an act of terrorism and a crime of prejudice on religious grounds.  
As a leader, Ahmad was also “substantially responsible for virtually 
ruining the lives of a number of other young men.”96  
The judgment concluded with an attempt to distinguish Ahmad’s 
sentence from those imposed against other members of the Toronto 18.  
Outcomes for three of the offenders who pleaded guilty to participating in 
Ahmad’s group—Durrani, James, and Ansari—are worth noting.  
Sentences ranged from 6.5 to 7.5 years.  But with each of them receiving 
credit for spending roughly three and a half years in pre-trial custody, they 
were sentenced to serve only a further day in custody.
97
  These are at the 
lowest end of the Canadian range (for involvement in plots to cause 
bodily harm or death), yet they are still higher than sentences imposed for 
peripheral figures involved in UK and Australian plots.
98
  However, it 
should be noted that the actual time served by these three offenders is 
among the shortest periods served for conduct of this nature in all three 
jurisdictions. 
 
V. DIRIE  
R v Dirie involved a highly unusual set of facts.  But it provides a 
sense of how maximum penalties and parole eligibility can shape a 
sentence in this area in significant ways.  Dirie was an associate of 
Ahmad, acting with the intent of aiding Ahmad’s emerging terrorist 
group. In August of 2005, Dirie, then in his early twenties, was arrested 
                                                 
95
  Ahmad, supra note 3 at para 14. 
96
  Ibid at para 56. 
97
  Ibid at paras 66 to 70.  With the maximum penalty for participation being 10 years, 
these sentences were in the middle range.  The conduct in at least one of these cases 
was well beyond the de minimus range.  Significantly, Durrani’s second bail review 
indicated that his involvement in the plot was serious enough to justify his continued 
detention in accordance with s 515(10)(c) of the Code: R v Durrani, [2008] OJ 5949 
(QL).  Among the circumstances Hill J noted at para 144 were Durrani’s attendance at 
training camps with Ahmad in Ramara and Rockwood Ontario, at which he used a 
firearm and, in the latter case, “took charge of several aspects of the camp”; his 
having worked closely with Ahmad at various stages; and his comments about bomb-
building and his willingness to die to advance the group’s goals.   
98
  See discussion below of R v Rahman & Mohammed, [2008] EWCA Crim 1465, 
[2008] 4 All ER 661, [2008] Crim LR 906; R v Sherif, [2008] EWCA Crim 2653, 
[2009] 2 Cr App Rep (S) 33 ; R v Sharrouf, [2009] NSWSC 1002 [Sharrouf]; R v 
Mulahalilovic, [2009] NSWSC 1010 [Mulahalilovic]. 
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upon attempting to re-enter Canada from Buffalo, New York, with two 
loaded semi-automatic weapons taped to his thigh, along with two other 
handguns and several rounds of ammunition on his person.  He was 
sentenced to two years on counts of possessing and importing firearms.  
At the time of that prosecution, authorities were unaware of his 
association with Ahmad, or that the purpose of his action was to assist in a 
terrorist group.  While in prison for the weapons charges, Dirie continued 
to assume a leading role in the group by communicating with various 
persons inside and outside the prison, including Ahmad.
99
 
In June 2006, while still in prison serving his sentence on the 
weapons charges, Dirie was arrested and charged with participating in a 
terrorist group.
100
  Following a guilty plea, counsel presented a joint 
submission that in addition to the two years for the weapons offences, a 
further seven years was appropriate for participation.  The only issue was 
how much credit to grant for pre-trial custody on the new charge.  The 
period in question began from the time that Dirie’s mandatory release on 
the earlier sentence would have occurred, in February of 2007.  Some 861 
days of the following 2.5 years to sentencing were spent in solitary 
confinement.  Dirie received two for one credit for this period, leaving 
only a further two years to be served—with parole eligibility after only a 
year.   
Durno J was doubtful of the offender’s prospects for 
rehabilitation, but offered a sound argument for the validity of a sentence 
that would entail only two further years of custody—for an offence that 
involved express intentions to commit mass murder.  “The maximum 
sentence permitted by Parliament for this offence is 10 years” he noted, 
“and with the two year sentence [Dirie] has already received, the effective 
nine year sentence for all his conduct is appropriate.”101  
The sentence is anomalous, in relation to both other Canadian 
cases and those in the UK and Australia.  Its outcome turned on its 
peculiar facts.  Yet, it does still serve to demonstrate how serious conduct 
might lead to a relatively short custodial term, given the operation of 
maximum sentences and non-parole provisions.  Thus, even if Dirie 
                                                 
99
  Dirie, supra note 3 at para 25 (An agreed statement of facts in the sentencing for the 
subsequent terrorism charges noted that “one of the group’s objectives was to 
facilitate or carry out violent acts that would cause death or serious bodily harm to 
persons” at para 25). 
100
  Contrary to s 83.18 of the Criminal Code.   
101
  Dirie, supra note 3 at para 35. 
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serves the full sentence, he will have spent a total of six years in 
custody—at least two of which involved continuing participation in a 





 is a decision of Leblond, JCQ of the Court of 
Québec involving the second life-sentence imposed under the new law.  
Namouh, in his mid-thirties, had struck an association with a European 
terror group called the “Global Islamic Media Front,” and expressed his 
willingness to conduct a suicide bombing on its behalf.  The group sought 
to persuade the German and Austrian governments to withdraw soldiers 
from Afghanistan by publishing an “open letter” video that threatened to 
carry out terrorist attacks.  (This was found by the court to be both an act 
of terrorism and an act of extortion.) The group was also associated with a 
group in Gaza that had kidnapped and held hostage an English journalist, 
Alan Johnston.   
Namouh helped to disseminate the “open letter” video, and to 
create and distribute other material.  He also helped facilitate covert 
communications with members of the group over the Internet.  Following 
a trial, he was convicted and sentenced to life for conspiracy to discharge 
an explosive device in a public place with the intent to cause serious 
bodily harm or death;
103
 four years for participation; eight for facilitation 
and eight for extortion in association with a terrorist group.
104
  
Among the aggravating factors were that it was a crime motivated 
by hate based on race, ethnicity and religion; that mass murder was the 
objective of Namouh’s online activity; that he was known, in online 
forums, to be a particularly zealous and diligent member; that he occupied 
an important place in the group; and that he was unrepentant.  Leblond 
JCQ distinguished the offender’s circumstances from those in Amara by 
asserting that in Namouh’s case, “there are no mitigating circumstances.  
The accused does not have the excuse of his youth.  There are no signs of 
a possible rehabilitation.  He remains dangerous.  He must be separated 
                                                 
102
  Namouh, supra note 37. 
103
  Contrary to Criminal Code, ss 431.2(2), 465(1)(c); Namouh, ibid at para 102. 
104
  The counts in question were contrary to ss 83.81, 83.19, 83.2, 346 of the Criminal 
Code, ibid.  At paragraph 102 of Namouh, ibid, Leblond JCQ found that the attempt 
to persuade Germany and Austria to remove solders from Afghanistan constituted 
extortion. 
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from society.  We do not know for that matter when, if ever, he will cease 
to be a danger.”105  The parole ineligibility period of the concurrent 20-
year sentence was 10 years, beginning from the time of arrest, or roughly 
seven years from sentencing.   
 
D.  DISCUSSION OF ISSUES ARISING FROM THE CANADIAN CASES 
The cases demonstrate that courts will seek to emphasize the 
principles of deterrence and denunciation, but also that other aspects of 
Canada’s sentencing framework play an important part in shaping 
outcomes at both ends of the spectrum of culpability.  At the lower end, 
the range includes 6.5 years (or time served after roughly 3.5 years in pre-
trial custody) for less central members of the Toronto 18, to the 20 years 
(10.5 before parole eligibility) imposed in Gaya.  In each of these 
sentences, courts took account of the principle of rehabilitation and of 
various mitigating factors. 
Among the more serious cases—Khawaja, Amara, Dirie, Ahmad, 
and Namouh—the sentences range from between nine years in Dirie (or 
six after credit) to life.  But notably, the parole ineligibility periods 
attaching to the life sentences—10 years from time of arrest—are 
relatively short compared to those imposed in roughly analogous UK and 
Australian decisions.   
To be clear, a life sentence with a relatively short non-parole 
period is not to be mistaken for a short sentence.  Parole eligibility does 
not make a sentence any shorter.  Thus, in one important sense, the fact 
that life sentences were imposed in Khawaja, Amara and Namouh proves 
that Canada has successfully instituted a framework in which the penalty 
for terrorism offences “duly reflects the seriousness” of the crime—as the 
UN Security Council had mandated in 2001.   
Yet this should be qualified by two further points.  One is that a 
survey of the Canadian cases demonstrates that for some offenders 
significantly involved in serious terror plots, a wide range of outcomes is 
still possible (e.g., Khalid, Dirie, Ahmad).  This is due in part to factors 
that include credit for pre-trial custody, maximum sentences (or Crown 
elections), and the need to balance opposing principles of sentencing.   
                                                 
105
  Namouh, supra note 37 at para 96. 
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Perhaps the most important of these factors, however, is the scope 
for Crown discretion.  As noted earlier, section 83.27 of the Criminal 
Code allows the Crown, upon notice, to seek a life sentence for any 
indictable offence where “the act or omission constituting the offence also 
constitutes a terrorist activity.”  The Crown can thus circumvent the 10 
and 14-year limits for participation and facilitation, and other maximum 
penalties.  In practice, this suggests a wide range of possible outcomes for 
offenders who play a significant role in serious plots.  For example, had 
the investigation in Dirie unfolded otherwise, with the full extent of 
Dirie’s involvement in a terrorist group known to the Crown earlier on, 
the Crown might have sought, and the court might have imposed, a much 
longer sentence.  The point here is that the outcome in Dirie was arguably 
shaped more by the Crown’s prosecutorial approach than it was with the 
court’s emphasis on deterrence and denunciation.  Thus, in future cases, 
conduct as serious as that in Dirie may well result in a much longer 
sentence.  And yet, where this does not occur, the reasons for it may well 
be in the public interest.  For example, it may seem prudent to the Crown 
to seek a shorter sentence as part of a plea agreement to obtain relevant 
testimony in other cases, and so forth.   
A second point to note relates to recent changes to the rules on 
giving credit for time served.  Bill C-25, which became the Truth In 
Sentencing Act, SC 2009, c 29, amends the rules, but not radically. A 
significant degree of credit for pre-trial custody can still be granted.  
Before the amendment, section 719(3) of the Criminal Code allowed 
courts the discretion to “take into account any time spent in custody by 
the person as a result of the offence.” The Supreme Court of Canada in R 
v Wust
106
 held that courts must credit offenders for pre-trial custody, but 
provided no strict formula for doing so.
107
  Two days’ credit for each day 
spent in pre-trial custody was common.  The Truth in Sentencing Act 
amended section 719(3) to limit the credit to be accorded for each day of 
pre-trial custody to one day—yet section 719(3.1) allows the sentencing 
judge to give up to one and a half days’ credit if the offender has not been 
detained pending trial due either to a breach of bail or to concerns with 
respect to their criminal record and “if the circumstances justify it.” The 
Code is silent on what these circumstances might include.   
All of the cases reviewed here precede the enactment of the Truth 
in Sentencing Act’s amendments to the Criminal Code, but if it did apply, 
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  2000 SCC 18, [2000] 1 SCR 455. 
107
  Ibid at para 44. 
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the impact would be marginal.  Dirie’s nine year sentence, for example, 
would have been 18 months to two years longer, and Ahmad’s 16 year 
sentence between two and three years longer.   
In summary, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s recent decisions in 
Khawaja and Khalid will likely result in longer sentences, with slightly 
less credit being granted for pre-trial custody.  Yet a significant variation 
in outcomes at both ends of the spectrum is still possible. 
A comparison of Canadian approaches to those of the UK and 
Australia lends further insight into the factors that help to shape outcomes 
in the Canadian context. 
 
V.  EVOLVING APPROACHES TO SENTENCING FOR TERRORISM IN THE 
UK 
As is the case in Canada, terrorism prosecutions in the UK are 
premised upon a combination of a similar set of new offences, along with 
older offences such as conspiracy to commit murder or to cause an 
explosion.
108
  Among the new offences introduced by the UK’s Terrorism 
Act 2000
109





 and possessing an article for a terrorist 
purpose.
112
  Penalties range from a maximum of six months imprisonment 
(for a summary conviction offence), to life imprisonment.  Notably, the 
UK Parliament, like its Canadian counterpart, has avoided the imposition 
of mandatory sentences for terrorism offences. 
While terror prosecutions in Canada and the UK bear similarities, 
approaches to sentencing are distinct.  In particular, a clear break is 
marked from both the Canadian framework and earlier UK jurisprudence 
                                                 
108
  Conspiracy to murder carries a maximum life sentence under section 3(2) of the 
Criminal Law Act 1977 (UK), c 45.  Conspiracy to cause an explosion carries a 
maximum life sentence under the Explosive Substances Act 1883 (UK), 46 & 47 Vict, 
c 3, s 1.  The principal convictions in three recent Canadian cases have also involved 
Criminal Code offences that predate the Anti-terrorism Act—in Khawaja, building an 
explosive device to endanger lives, ss 81(1)(a), 81(1)(d); in Amara, s 81(1)(a); and in 
Namouh, conspiracy to cause an explosion, s 465(1)(c).   
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  Supra note 19. 
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  Ibid ss 11, 12. 
111
  Ibid s 15. 
112
  Ibid s 57; this was initially a ten year maximum but amended to fifteen years by the 
Terrorism Act 2006 (UK), c 11, s 13(1). 
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by the 2007 ruling of the Court of Appeal for England and Wales in R v 
Barot.
113
  Prior to Barot, UK decisions for a terrorist conspiracy to 
commit murder ranged from 30 to 45 years.
114
 Terrorist conspiracies to 
cause an explosion endangering life ranged from 20 to 35 years.
115
 
The ceiling would be raised with Barot.  This case concerned the 
appeal of one of eight members of a terrorist group that had conspired to 
carry out four attacks.  The most serious involved the use of three 
limousines containing propane gas cylinders and remotely controlled 
explosive devices.  These were to be used in an underground parkade of 
an office building, with a view to causing hundreds of casualties.  
Receiving a life sentence with a 40-year non-parole period, Barot 
appealed on the basis that the conspiracy had been foiled.   
On appeal, Lord Phillips CJ held that longer sentences should be 
imposed in terrorism cases as a consequence to amendments in the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, which sets out new guidelines for parole 
ineligibility for murder, indicating that where the seriousness of the 
offence is “exceptionally high” (defined in part as “a murder done for the 
purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause”), a 
“whole life order” is appropriate.116  Where the seriousness is 
“particularly high” (defined in part as “a murder involving the use of a 
firearm or explosive”), the starting point is 30 years.117  
Lord Phillips CJ held that the “effect of [schedule] 21 has been to 
increase significantly the minimum terms being imposed for the most 
serious murders,” and by implication, for attempted murder and 
conspiracy.
118
  Setting out a general framework, he stated that “a life 
sentence with a minimum term of forty years should, save in quite 
exceptional circumstances, represent the maximum sentence for a terrorist 
who sets out to achieve mass murder but is not successful in causing any 
                                                 
113
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physical harm,” while for conspiracy or acts that “fall short of an 
attempt,” the sentence would be lower.119  Barot’s life sentence was 
appropriate given the intent of the conspiracy—“mass murder of innocent 
citizens on a massive scale”120—but given the uncertainty that any of the 
four conspiracies would move beyond the planning stages, parole 
ineligibility was reduced from 40 to 30 years. 
Barot was followed in the UK’s most serious terrorism case, R v 
Ibrahim,
121
 which involved the failed London bombing attempt that took 
place two weeks after the attacks on July 7, 2005.  Detonators in the 
backpacks of all four of the offenders entering the subway failed at the 




Other cases that have applied the Barot framework include R v 
Jalil,
123
 which concerned Barot’s four co-accused (charged with 
conspiracy to cause an explosion endangering life, with sentences ranging 
from 15 to 25 years); R v Asiedu
124
 (an accomplice in the failed London 
plot who abandoned his bomb in bushes moments before the intended 
attack, receiving a sentence of 33 years imprisonment); and the UK 
companion case to the matter involving Momin Khawaja, Khyam (life, 
with non-parole periods from 17.5 or 20 years).
125
  Following Barot, UK 
sentencing decisions suggest the likelihood of a life sentence in cases 
involving a conspiracy to commit murder, and roughly 20 or more years 
for causing an explosion endangering life.  The non-parole periods have 
tended to range from 20 to 40 years, depending on the degree of 
culpability and viability of the plot. 
Sentences for a host of other, less serious terror-related offences 
under the new laws explored above have entailed shorter custodial terms.  
This is due in part to lower maximum sentences in the legislation, but also 
with the court’s inclination to accord greater weight to mitigating factors.  
In R v Rahman,
126
 appeals against six- and four-year sentences for 
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122
  Ibid.   
123
  [2008] EWCA Crim 2910, [2009] 2 Cr App R (S) 40. 
124
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disseminating terrorist publications were reduced to 5.5 and two years.  In 
R v Sherif,
127
 various sentences were reduced for a group of offenders 
peripherally involved in the failed bombing of the London subway on July 
21, 2005.  The lowest of the sentences imposed at trial—three and four 
years—were upheld, as were maximum sentences handed down for some 




In summary, UK terror sentencing, following Barot, has entailed 
longer custodial periods for principal offenders in serious plots, and 
shorter sentences for marginal figures in less serious plots.  Yet even the 
shorter sentences are generally not as short as in the less serious Canadian 
cases.   
 
VI.  RECENT APPROACHES TO SENTENCING FOR TERRORISM IN 
AUSTRALIA 
Following 9/11, various terror-related offences were added to part 
5.3 of Australia’s Criminal Code.129  The Code (Aust) also includes a 
definition of terrorism modeled after that set out in the UK’s Terrorism 
Act 2000.
130
  New offences capture the act of possessing a thing 
connected with preparation for or assistance in a terrorist act (with a 
maximum 15-year penalty);
131
 collecting or making a document with the 
same connection (a maximum of 15 years);
132
 and the catchall provision, 
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  [2008] EWCA Crim 2653, [2009] 2 Cr App R (S) 33. 
128
  Ibid.   
129
  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Schedule [Criminal Code (Aust) or Code (Aust)], as 
amended by Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth).  For an overview 
of these additions, see Edwina MacDonald & George Williams, “Combating 
Terrorism: Australia’s Criminal Code Since September 11, 2001” (2007) 16:1 
Griffith L Rev 27; Simon Bronitt & Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal 
Law (Pyrmont: Thompson Reuters Australia, 2005) at 871–897.  
130
  Subsections 100.1(1)–(2) of the Code (Aust) defines terrorism as an action causing, 
among other things, “serious harm that is physical harm to a person” or “serious 
damage to property” with the intention “of advancing a political, religious or 
ideological cause” or of “coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of 
the Commonwealth or a State … or intimidating the public.”  Exceptions are made in 
subsection 100.1(3) for political dissent, protest, and strike actions not intended to 
cause physical harm or death. 
131
  Criminal Code (Aust) s 101.4. 
132
  Ibid s 101.5. 
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doing any act in preparation for, or planning, a terrorist act (a maximum 
of life).
133
  In a manner analogous to Canada’s facilitation and 
participation provisions, the Australian Code requires, for each of these 




General guidelines for the sentencing of criminal offences in the 
Australian context are found in section 16A of the Crimes Act 1914.
135
 
Courts are required to consider the nature of the offence and the 
offender’s culpability, along with his or her remorse and rehabilitative 
prospects.  In terrorism cases, however, the courts have asserted the need 
to subordinate these factors in favour of an emphasis upon the principles 
of general deterrence and protection of the community.
136
  Australian law 
also notably lacks a provision analogous to Canada’s totality principle, 
codified in section 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code.  This precludes 
Canadian courts from imposing a set of consecutive sentences that is 
“unduly long or harsh.”137  In the absence of an equivalent provision, 
Australian judges have demonstrated greater flexibility than their 
Canadian counterparts in emphasizing deterrence or concerns about 
public safety above other principles of sentencing. 
Differences between Canadian and Australian law on parole 
eligibility are also notable.  Section 19AG of Australia’s Crimes Act, 1914 
imposes a minimum parole ineligibility period of three quarters of the 
“aggregate” sentence imposed for certain offences, including the 
“terrorism offences” set out in Part 5.3 of the Code (Aust) among 
others.
138
  This is to say that where concurrent sentences are imposed, the 
                                                 
133
  Ibid s 101.6. 
134
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consideration in terrorism sentencing is explored by Spigelman CJ in R v Lodhi, 
[2007] NSWCCA 360 at paras 93–110 [Lodhi (Appeal)]. 
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aggregate sentence would refer to the longest of them; where consecutive 
sentences are imposed, it would refer to the total sentence.
139
  
The leading sentencing case under post-9/11 law in Australia is 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in Lodhi.
140
  With the 
intention of carrying out a bombing, Lodhi collected maps of the 
Australian electrical supply system and made efforts to obtain explosives.  
He was convicted of collecting a document, possessing a thing, and doing 
a thing—all in preparation for a terrorist act.141  At sentencing, Whealy J 
noted that at the time of arrest, the choice of bomber, the area to be 
bombed, and the method of carrying out the bombing had not been 
decided.
142
  Yet Lodhi’s culpability was still significant.  The court 
imposed concurrent 10-year sentences on the counts of possessing a thing 
and collecting a document, and 20 years for doing a thing in preparation.  
Parole ineligibility was set at 15 years.   
Lodhi’s sentence was upheld on appeal.  Spigelman CJ and Price J 
offered separate but concurring reasons, while Barr J dissented.  For 
Spigelman CJ, the sentence was justified despite the fact that the appellant 
“did not go beyond collecting materials for future use.”143  The intent was 
inherently serious, and the appellant had “not resiled from the extremist 
intention with which these acts were performed.”144 Price J was careful to 
distinguish between the concept of an offence that imposes liability at an 
earlier stage of a terrorist conspiracy and the objective seriousness of the 
conduct at issue.  “It does not follow,” he wrote, “that as long as the 
preparatory acts relied upon to constitute the offences are in their infancy 
criminal culpability must necessarily be low.”145  







  Touma was a 
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principal of a group of nine others in a 2005 plot.  He had acquired 
ammunition and attempted to build a bomb, but a doubt remained about 
his intent to target humans.  Given the guilty plea and resilement from 
extremist views, a sentence of 18 years and nine months was warranted, 
discounted to 14 years, with a non-parole period of 10 years and six 
months.   
Benbrika dealt with the sentencing of seven offenders involved in 
activities that occurred between 2003 and 2005.  Benbrika spoke at 
various mosques and community centres, in an effort to recruit members 
to his group.  With a view to staging a bombing, he raised funds and 
organized a training camp.  Given the seriousness of the conduct, coupled 
with Benbrika’s lingering extremist views, the trial judge, Bongiorno J, 
held that deterrence and incapacitation were primary considerations.
149
 
For the principal count of leading the group, Benbrika received a 15-year 
sentence, with a non-parole period of 12 years, which the Victorian Court 
of Appeal has upheld.
150
 Yet the Court of Appeal also lowered the 
sentences for some of the less-culpable members—for counts of 
membership and providing resources—to terms that ranged from eight to 
four years and six months.  As noted above, these sentences represent a 
lower range than that imposed against analogously marginal offenders in 
Canada’s Toronto 18 cases. 
The most recent of the Australian cases, Elomar,
151
 involved the 
longest custodial terms thus far imposed in Australia under post-9/11 law.  
The group had stockpiled firearms and explosives, and members attended 
two camps.  The intent was to carry out bombings at unspecified 
locations.  Each offender was convicted of preparation of a terrorist act.
152
  
The Crown did not seek life sentences, given the failure to establish an 
intent to kill.
153
 Y et Whealy J accepted the Crown’s assertion that the 
conspiracy “clearly encompassed in the mind of each of the offenders a 
real risk of danger to human life.”154  Sentences ranged from 28 to 23 
years, with non-parole periods ranging from 21 to 17 years.  
                                                 
149
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150
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  Mulahlilovic dealt with an offender 
who acquired a firearm for “O,” a person with extremist sympathies.  
Whealy J found the extent of Mulahalilovic’s culpability to consist in his 
recklessness as to the possible terrorist use of the ammunition.  He 
imposed a sentence of four years and eight months, with a non-parole 
period of three and a half years.  Sharrouf concerned the acquisition of 
various clocks and batteries for a terrorist group.  In imposing a sentence 
of five years and three months, and parole ineligibility at just under four 
years, Whealy J held that the seriousness of the offence was mitigated by 
the offender’s schizophrenia.159  Kent dealt with the charges of being 
member of a terrorist group and making a document likely to facilitate 
terrorist acts.
160
 An aggregate sentence of 5.5 years was imposed, with a 
non-parole period of three years and nine months.  Kazaal was a more 
serious terrorist document case, involving the production and 
dissemination of a book titled “Provisions on the Rules of Jihad.” The 
offender’s lack of remorse and efforts to minimize the seriousness of his 
actions were further considerations in imposing a sentence of 12 years, 
with a non-parole period of nine years. 
In summary, at the higher end of the spectrum, Australian courts 
may not have imposed a life sentence, but as the cases demonstrate, courts 
have the capacity to impose, and generally tend to impose, longer 
determinate custodial terms with longer non-parole periods than in 
Canada. 
 
VII. POINTS TO DRAW FROM A COMPARISON OF THE THREE REGIMES 
At the higher end of the spectrum in all three jurisdictions, courts 
have emphasized deterrence and denunciation by imposing lengthy 
custodial terms, though Canadian non-parole periods have been much 
shorter.  Thus, where both the sentences and non-parole periods were long 
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in the UK decisions in Ibrahim (life, 40 years without parole) and Khyam 
(life, 20 years without non-parole) and the Australian case of Elomar (28 
years, 21 without parole), the sentences alone were comparably long in 
Khawaja (life, five years without parole computed from, sentencing) and 




At the lower end of the spectrum, courts in all three jurisdictions 
have imposed shorter sentences for those peripherally involved in serious 
plots, with Australian courts imposing the shortest.
162
  Yet, as noted, 
while some of the sentences at the lower range of the Canadian cases were 
not as short as those in the Australian cases, the actual period served was 
relatively short (3.5 years Durrani, James, and Ansari).
163
 
The comparison highlights two further points of a general nature 
about Canada’s approach to terror sentencing.  One is that given the 
courts’ emphasis on deterrence and denunciation, life sentences or lengthy 
determinate sentences may be likely in the future despite the presence of 
mitigating circumstances, such as age, a lack of knowledge of the 
specifics of the plot at issue, or a repudiation of terror.
164
  
Another point is that prosecutorial discretion about how to proceed 
will, in some cases, allow for a wider range of outcomes than may be 
possible in comparable UK or Australian decisions.  This is due in part to 
the lack of an equivalent provision in UK or Australian law to section 
83.27 in Canada’s Criminal Code.  It is also due to the combined function 
of other facets of Canada’s sentencing regime, including competing 
principles of sentencing, non-parole periods, and maximum sentences 
(where they might apply).   
 
CONCLUSION 
The first round of sentencing cases for terrorism offences in 
Canada has offered a good sense of what to expect in the future.  As with 
the approach in the UK and Australia, Canadian courts will tend to 
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impose lengthy sentences for serious offenders, but with relatively shorter 
non-parole periods.  In some cases, life sentences will be imposed where 
only lengthy determinate sentences might have been imposed in Australia 
or the UK.  Yet, at the lower end of the Canadian spectrum, marginal 
members of serious plots may continue to receive relatively short 
sentences, with release after three or four years of custody, most of which 
in pre-trial.  The merits of any penalty imposed in future Canadian cases 
will depend on a consideration of a wide range of criteria.  This includes 
an assessment of how competing principles of sentencing were applied, 
how much credit for pre-trial custody was granted, and how the Crown 
elected to proceed. 
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